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This paper reviews the issues concerning the integration of the Baltic States into the 
 European Union (EU).  The focus is on fiscal policy and institutions of policy 
convergence.  More specifically, we evaluate the functioning, suitability, and 
effectiveness of the Maastricht convergence criteria on fiscal policy and the 
Stability and Growth Pact for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.  Using the European 
Commission's approach, we estimate output gap measures to provide empirical 
evidence on fiscal discipline and cyclical sensitivity of each state's budget to 
changes in output. Empirical evidence indicates that Estonia and Latvia have been 
more successful in maintaining fiscal discipline than Lithuania during 1996-2000.  
Evidence on the cyclical sensitivity of the Baltic States suggests that the Stability 
and Growth Pact signed in July 1997 would offer enough room for automatic fiscal 
stabilizers in Estonia and Latvia, but not in Lithuania. Implications of our results for 
future perspectives are also discussed.
  2  
I. Introduction 
 
This paper deals with institutions of fiscal convergence, namely the Maastricht 
convergence criteria on fiscal policy and the Stability and Growth Pact. The fiscal 
institutions are analyzed from the point of view of three Baltic States, taking into 
account past fiscal performance and budgetary developments, the ongoing transition 
process, as well as these countries’ aim to become EU members.
   
 
Economic and monetary union, EMU, constitutes an integral part of the acquis.
 1 In 
consequence, compliance with EMU institutions – formal rules, informal constraints 
and enforcement- is an important part of accession preparations in Central and 
Eastern European countries planning to become the European Union (EU) members. 
The Maastricht Treaty’s EMU provisions provide the legal basis for eventual full 
economic and monetary union in the EU, and for the transition towards it. The first 
stage begun in July 1990, prior to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. During this 
phase EU member countries agreed to increase monetary cooperation and 
convergence as well as abolish all remaining capital controls. The second stage 
started at the beginning of January 1994, with the creation of the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI), a forerunner of the European Central Bank (ECB). The 
EMI was charged with two main tasks. First, it had to strengthen monetary 
cooperation within the EU. Moreover, it had to make necessary preparations for the 
establishment of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), for a conduct of a 
single monetary policy, and for the creation of a single currency in the third, final 
stage. The beginning of the stage two was also associated with various new rules. 
National central banks within the EU were no longer allowed directly to provide 
credit to governments and to bail out any public entities or force investments in 
public debt. At the same time, governments were obliged to ensure independence to 
their own central banks. In the second stage it was also agreed that the member 
countries would try to avoid excessive deficits. In May 1998 the governments of 
                                                            
1 Regarding the basic concepts and history of EMU, see http://www.europa.eu.int.euro and 
http:// www.ecb.org. About the prospects for and policies in EMU, see Taylor (1995) and Eijfinger 
and DeHaan (2000).  
  3 EMU countries appointed the members of the Executive Board of the European 
Central Bank, effective June 1, 1998, which also marked the establishment of the 
ECB and ESCB.  
 
The stage three of EMU refers to full EMU, that is participation in the euro-zone. It 
was originally decided that if most member countries fulfil the so-called Maastricht 
convergence criteria in 1996, the third final stage of EMU could then begin in 1997. 
However, as it turned out, there were not enough qualifying countries. The 
observations regarding the establishment of the euro-zone shows that for most EU 
member states the compliance with the government deficit and debt criteria turned 
out to be particularly difficult. In consequence, the third stage of EMU was 
postponed until January 1999. Initially, 11 countries joined to form the euro-zone, 
including Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, 
Austria, Finland, Portugal and Ireland. Greece became a part of the euro-area at the 
beginning of 2001. Countries currently still outside the euro-zone include the UK, 
Sweden and Denmark.  
 
The third stage of EMU has been divided into three sub-phases: From January 1999 
till the end of 2001 national currencies remain in circulation, with irrevocably fixed 
exchange rates vis-à -vis the euro. During this phase, transactions between financial 
institutions have been conducted in euros. In addition, individuals and firms may 
still hold accounts either in their own national currencies or in euros. Furthermore, 
new issues of government debt have been made in euros. The second sub-stage lasts 
from the beginning of 2002 till the end of February 2002. During this time, euro 
bank notes and coins will replace national currencies. Finally, the last sub-stage 
becomes effective at the beginning of March 2002. From this date onwards, the euro 
will be the single currency, and national currencies no longer maintain their status 
as a legal tender. 
 
Just like in the case of initial participants in the euro zone, the eligibility of new 
member states to join the euro-zone and to adopt the euro depends on the degree of 
sustainable convergence along the lines of the Maastricht convergence criteria. 
  4 Convergence is measured based on four aspects of national economic performance: 
inflation, public finances, interest rates, and exchange rates.
2 
 
With respect to the price stability objective, the Maastricht Treaty implies that an 
average inflation rate, measured on the basis of the consumer price index, should 
not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage points that of, at most, the three best 
performing member countries. Overall, in the euro-area, the primary objective of 
monetary policy is to maintain inflation in the range of 0-2% a year. In addition, 
participating countries should avoid too wide inflation differentials. Regarding the 
fiscal criteria, the Maastricht treaty requires sustainable fiscal position, meaning that 
there is no excessive deficit. This applies both to the budget deficit to GDP and the 
ratio of gross government debt to GDP. The convergence criteria for exchange rate 
stability means that the currency has maintained within the normal fluctuation 
margins of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)
3, +/- 15%, without severe 
tensions for at least two years. In particular, no devaluation should have had 
occurred on the initiative of the member country concerned. Finally, the interest rate 
criteria means that the average long-term interest rate should not exceed by more 
than 2 percentage points the interest rates in, at most, the three best performing 
countries in terms of price stability. 
 
From the Union’s eastern enlargement point of view, it should be made clear that 
the Maastricht convergence criteria outlined above are not accession criteria. Upon 
accession, all member countries must participate in EMU, but not the euro zone. 
Thus, after having been accepted as EU members, candidate countries are not 
obliged to immediately adopt the euro. Indeed, for the time being the candidate 
countries should focus primarily on how to meet fully the Copenhagen criteria, 
including the EMU acquis. However, eventually, all EU member countries are 
expected to join the euro zone. Therefore, the Maastricht targets do represent good 
                                                            
2 For a review of monetary policies of candidate transition economies, see Dibooglu and Kutan 
(2001) and Kutan and Brada (2000).  Brada and Kutan (2001) provide empirical evidence for the 
degree of convergence of candidate countries' monetary policy with that oft he European Union. 
3 For Conventions and Procedures for the New ERM, ERMII, see Press Release, 12 September, 
1998: http//www.ecb.int. 
  5 long-, or medium-term policy goals for the current Central and Eastern European 
candidate countries.  
 
In this paper, we evaluate the functioning, suitability and effectiveness of the 
Maastricht convergence criteria on fiscal policy and the Stability and Growth Pact 
for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The suitability is based on the past fiscal 
performance in the Baltic countries, ongoing transition, as well as their aspirations 
to become EU members. Regarding the effectiveness, North’s theory of institutions 
(North 1990, 1991, and 1997) suggests that a certain institution or institutional 
framework is efficient, if it contributes to economic growth. While economic 
growth is the eventual result of effective institutions, there are, however, issues that 
one should remember to take into consideration. First, the effectiveness of an 
institution or an institutional matrix is related to its credibility. After all, regulations 
and procedures would be ineffective, if economic actors, whether companies, 
individuals, or countries, do not implement these agreed rules and procedures. Thus, 
compliance and enforcement are part of the effectiveness of institutions
4. Given the 
desire of the Baltic States integration into the EU, institutions can be considered 
effective not only if they contribute to economic growth but also if they promote 
integration towards full EU membership, including, at some point, also participation 
in the euro-zone.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: In section II, we describe the functioning of the 
institutions in question, i.e. the Maastricht fiscal convergence criteria and the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Section III reviews the past fiscal performance and 
convergence in the Baltic States, measured against the Maastricht budgetary rules. 
In addition, future perspectives for fiscal policy are discussed.  Section IV discusses 
the suitability and effectiveness of the fiscal institutions while section V provides 
output gap estimates using the Hodrick-Presscott procedure to examine the cyclical 
sensitivity of the Baltic national budgets. Section V also offers evidence about the 
                                                            
4 Several studies have emphasized the importance of institutions in shaping budgetary policies and 
outcomes (see, for example, Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1995; Corsetti 
and Roubini, 1996; Von Hagen, 1992; and Von Hagen and Harden, 1996).  All these studies, 
however, focus on western European countries. To our knowledge, this is among the first studies that 
examine these issues for the candidate Baltic States. 
  6 suitability of the Stability and Growth Pact for offering enough room for automatic 
fiscal stabilizers.  Overall conclusions follow in section VI.  
 
II. Institutions of Fiscal Convergence and Discipline: The Maastricht 
Convergence Criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact 
 
Disciplined fiscal policies are crucial for the success of EMU. Sound government 
finances promote price stability and strong, sustainable growth in output and 
employment. In principle, market forces could work against irresponsible fiscal 
policies. However, practice shows that the discipline exerted by financial markets 
does not necessarily ensure that governments take into account their budget 
constraints.
5 This provides a good argument for supplementing market forces with 
some common rules. Indeed, there is an increasing amount of literature supporting 
the view that budgetary institutions are important determinants of fiscal 
performance (See Buti and Sapir, 1998, and the references in footnote 4). While 
inadequate fiscal institutions may not be the main reason for deficits or debts, they 
do tend to slow down the budgetary adjustment processes towards a sound 
budgetary position. Perhaps among the strongest empirical examples of fiscal 
institutions are the rules specified by the Maastricht Treaty establishing the 
European Community as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam (thereof to be 
referred as the “Treaty”) and the Stability and Growth Pact signed in Amsterdam in 
June 1997. These rules provide countries in the EU, and in particular those, which 
have adopted the euro, with a common code of fiscal conduct. The rules (thereof 
referred as Maastricht rules) consist of reference values for deficits and debt to be 
achieved within a certain timeframe, a common accounting framework for 
computing public finance variables and a call to adapt national procedures to the 
requirements of budgetary discipline. 
 
In Stage Three of EMU fiscal policy remains an exclusive competence of the 
member countries. While the Treaty ensures absolute budgetary autonomy, the 
conduct of national budgetary policies is nevertheless subject to rules of budgetary 
discipline and coordinating procedures at the Community level (Title VII, Chapter I 
                                                            
5 See, for example, European Central Bank (1999).  
  7 on “Economic Policy”).
6 The general guidelines and rules provide that member 
states regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern, on the basis of 
the close co-ordination of member states’ economic policies within the ECOFIN 
Council.
7 The Maastricht criteria with respect to sustainable fiscal position mean 
that a country should avoid excessive deficit. There are two interpretations of 
excessive deficit. One refers to a situation where a country’s budget deficit is higher 
than 3 % of GDP. However, a couple of exceptions to this rule are accepted. The 
first applies if the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and has reached 
a level that comes close to 3% of GDP – the condition of closeness. The second 
exception refers to a situation where the higher than 3 % of GDP deficit is only 
exceptional and temporary and the deficit remains close to 3% of GDP – the 
conditions of exceptionality and temporariness. It should be emphasized that for a 
member state to be exempt from being in an excessive deficit position all three 
conditions outlined -exceptionality, temporariness and closeness- need to apply 
simultaneously.  
 
The other interpretation for unbalanced fiscal situation is the ratio of gross 
government debt to GDP exceeding 60%. Again, one exception is accepted. That is 
when the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a 
satisfactory pace. Finally, the decision as to whether a country has an excessive 
deficit or not lies with the ECOFIN Council (thereof referred as Council), which 
acts upon recommendations received from the European Commission.  
 
In June 1997 the European Council reached a final agreement regarding the 
Stability and Growth Pact. 
8 The Pact lays down the rules for economic policy co-
ordination and defines the conditions under which the excessive deficit procedure is 
applied in Stage three of EMU. Technically, the Pact consists of two Council 
regulations and a European Council resolution.
9 The regulations clarify the Treaty’s 
                                                            
6 All references in this article refer to provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force on  
May , 1999 and which consolidates the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty and the amendments 
made to it thereafter. 
7 ECOFIN Council consists of the Ministers of Finance and Economy of the EU member countries. 
8 See:http://www.europa.eu.int (Policies: monetary and fiscal affairs, budget). 
9 Council Regulations (EC) No. 1466/97 & 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 and Resolution of the European 
Council of 17 June 1997. 
  8 provisions concerning excessive deficits, especially the situation in which the 3 per 
cent reference value is exceeded. In addition, the regulations determine the timing 
and magnitude of the sanctions imposed on a member country having an excessive 
deficit. The resolution in turn is an expression of political commitment, providing 
guidance to the Council and member states on the application of the Pact, but 
having no legal force. 
 
Under the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, countries participating in the 
monetary union commit themselves to a medium-term budget target of “close to 
balance or surplus budget”. This means that while the budget deficit is kept at or 
below the reference value, normal cyclical fluctuations are still allowed. In the 
context of the Stability and Growth Pact, those member states that are part of the 
euro-zone are obliged to submit to the ECOFIN Council and the European 
Commission stability programs. If a member state has not yet adopted the single 
currency, it will provide a convergence program. The programs are annually 
updated and they should contain the Member State’s medium-term objective for a 
close to balance or surplus budget, as well as the adjustment path towards this 
objective. In addition, their content and format follow an agreed pattern. Twice a 
year (March 1 and September 1) the member states have to provide budgetary data 
to the European Commission, which then reports to the Council. The Council either 
approves the national stability program, or requires a country to make adjustments 
to it. In case the Council comes to a conclusion that a country has an excessive 
deficit, a member country is called to make adjustments and the Council issues 
recommendations regarding the implementation of these adjustment measures. 
 
From the time of reporting by the member country, the Council has three months 
time to decide on the existence of excessive deficit. In practical terms, the Council 
must make its decisions by the beginning of June, assuming that data was submitted 
to the Commission at the beginning of March or by the beginning of December, if 
the data was submitted at the beginning of September. The Council can recommend 
that excessive deficits are corrected as soon as possible and may establish two 
deadlines. One requires the member country to take effective action within four 
  9 months after identification of an excessive deficit. The other deadline calls for the 
completion of the correction of an excessive deficit within a year following the 
identification of an excessive deficit. The Council monitors the overall 
implementation of the national budget programs and if necessary, imposes sanctions 
or even intensifies sanctions on a member state concerned. Within seven months 
from the submission of the report by a member country (by October or by April), 
the Council makes a decision whether its recommendations have been followed and 
implemented. At this point the Council also considers whether the recommendations 
should be made public. After one month from this, (November 1 or May 1), or 
within eight months from the submission of the report by the member country, the 
Council must decide on measures to reduce the deficit. The member country can 
avoid sanctions if, after the Council has requested concrete measures, it takes the 
necessary measures in two months time after receiving the notification. After these 
two months (by January 1 or July 1), the Council can impose sanctions, provided 
that a member state has failed to take necessary measures or that the measures have 
been inadequate. Within four months from this point onwards (by May or 
November), the Council decides on an intensification of the sanctions or makes a 
public statement announcing that an excessive deficit no longer exists. 
 
All in all, the procedural steps outlined in the Stability and Growth pact introduces a 
ten months time frame from the member country’s submission of budgetary data to 
the European Commission to the actual application of sanctions by the Council 
(March-January, or September-July). Finally, it should be noted that while the 
Treaty defines an excessive deficit in terms of deficit and the debt ratio, the Stability 
and Growth Pact, however, specifies sanctions only in case of the deficit ratio, but 
not in case of the debt ratio.  
 
The sanctions themselves take the form of non-interest bearing deposit. First, there 
is so-called the initial deposit, which consists of two parts. The fixed component is 
0.2% of GDP. The variable component in turn is equal to 0.1% of GDP for each 
percentage point that the government deficit is above the reference value of 3 per 
cent in the year that the deficit occurs. The upper limit for the annual deposit is 
  100.5% of GDP. The second form of sanctions consists of additional deposits. These 
must be made each year, until the deficit is corrected. The additional deposit is 0.1% 
of a country’s GDP for each percentage point that the government deficit is above 3 
per cent reference value. Finally, the deposit is converted into a fine when a member 
country has not made necessary corrections to its excessive deficit within two years. 
 
The rules defining the sustainable fiscal position and particularly the exceptions 
related to excessive deficits provide some room for maneuver. If a country is 
considered having an exceptional budget deficit, then no sanctions will be imposed. 
According to the Pact, a deficit, which exceeds 3% of GDP is considered 
‘exceptional’ if a country’s GDP declines by at least 2 percent in the year in 
question. Empirical evidence in the EU shows that during the period of 1961-97 
such a situation was recorded in 7 cases out of 475 (Buti and Sapir, 1998). A 
country may also claim exceptional circumstances if it suffers from a recession in 
which real GDP declines by less than 2 per cent but more that 0.75 per cent. In this 
case, however, a country concerned must show that its recession was exceptional 
compared to the past output trends. Buti and Sapir (1998) indicate that in the EU 
area this type of situation was observed in 30 cases out of 475 in the period of 1961-
97. The last way to claim that the deficit over 3% of GDP is exceptional refers to a 
situation, in which the deficit results from an annual event outside the control of the 
member country, but nevertheless has a substantial impact on the government’s 
financial position.  
 
To what extent, if at all, have the Maastricht rules affected the current EU member 
countries and their fiscal policies?
10 The past performance indicates that before the 
adoption of the Maastricht rules, during 1970s and 1980s, the fiscal policies in EU 
countries did not follow the neo-classical theory of optimal tax smoothing. 
According to this principle, tax rates should be kept constant over the business cycle 
(Buti and Sapir, 1998). Thus, taxes are not raised when a country experiences an 
economic slowdown. Instead deficits occur during recessions but are reversed 
                                                            
10 See, for example: European Commission. 2000. Public Finances in EMU-2000. European 
Economy. Number 3, 2000. Brussels: European Commission, Directorate-General for Financial and 
Economic Affairs. 
  11during expansionary growth. Over the cycle, these cyclical fluctuations should even 
out. Instead of following this traditional ‘tax-smoothing’ strategy, in the 1970s and 
1980s many EU countries accumulated their budgetary imbalances during periods 
of favorable growth. In particular, the accumulation of government debt was fuelled 
by a persistent structural deficit of close to 3% of GDP. However, a clear regime 
shift was observed in the 1990s. The experience in EU countries shows that during 
the past decade the Maastricht budgetary rules have initiated a process of budgetary 
consolidation in which EU member states started to streamline their institutional, 
accounting, and reporting procedures in order to comply with the Maastricht 
targets.
11 As government debts and budget deficits have shifted to a downward path, 
the budgetary adjustments have mainly involved significant reductions in primary 
government expenditures, and to a less extent tax increases. Moreover, expenditure 
reductions have taken the form of cuts in social expenditure and wages. This 
evidence suggests that the Maastricht rules and regulations for fiscal policy 
represent institutions that have succeeded in enforcing fiscal discipline among the 
EU members.  
 
III. Fiscal Convergence in the Baltic States: Past Performance and Future 
Perspectives 
 
The Maastricht rules have provided, if nothing more, at least an encouraging start to 
budgetary consolidation to correct the public finance imbalances, which existed at 
the beginning of 1990s in most EU member states. This raises an important question 
about the possible role that such fiscal institutions may play in the Central and 
Eastern European candidate countries. To shed some lights on this question, we 
shall next review the Baltic States’ fiscal performance in the course of transition, 
measured against the Maastricht rules. This will be followed by an assessment on 
the suitability and effectiveness of the Maastricht fiscal criteria and the Stability and 
Growth Pact, from the Baltic States’ point of view.  Finally, chapter five will 
present more detailed calculations about output gaps and cyclical sensitivity of the 
Baltic national budgets.  
                                                            
11 See European Central Bank, (1999), Eijfinger and DeHaan (2000), and Buti and Sapir (1998). 
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First, it should be noted that considerable data comparability problem still persists in 
the area of public finance, especially with respect to the definitions and the coverage 
of government deficits. This concerns not only the Baltic States but also the other 
candidate countries as well. The Commission's regular reports from last year 
indicate that there are few candidate countries that are able to provide fiscal data on 
The New European System of Accounts (ESA)
 basis. But the assessment is much 
more positive with respect to IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) accounting 
framework, as most countries closely approximate the GFS methodology. Estonia’s 
budgetary data is already compiled in accordance with ESA standards. In Latvia, 
calculation methods to a large extent correspond to ESA. In Lithuania, the process is 
yet to be completed. In all Baltic States fiscal data is based on the GFS 
methodology. At present, both Eurostat and the Directorate General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs are working together with the applicant countries, to improve 
the quality of the government data and to harmonize them with EU requirements.
 12 
Commission reports in turn rely on the data based upon the individual definitions 
used by each Baltic country.
 13 Therefore, it is not strictly comparable, nor does it 
conform to the data definitions that will form part of fiscal criteria for the adoption 
of the euro, nor the future excessive deficit procedure. Given the facts outlined, the 
data and conclusions based on it should be treated with caution.  
 
Tables 1-3 show the development of government balance, revenues and expenditure 
in the Baltic States during the period of 1996-2000. Table 4 presents the real GDP 
                                                            
12 The data and overall discussion in this section are based on the Baltic national statistics and 
Commission’s reports on economic development in these countries.  Data sources are provided in 
detail  in Table 1. 
13 European Commission. Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. European 
Economy, Supplement C. Economic Developments and Structural Reform in the Candidate 
Countries. Number 4. November 2000.  
European Commission. 2000 Regular Reports From the Commission on Estonia’s / Latvia’s / 
Lithuania’s Progress Towards Accession.  8 November 2000. 
European Commission. ECFIN/441/00-EN. Enlargement Papers. Recent Fiscal Developments in the 







  13growth rates in the respective period. Tables 1 and 4 include also the Commission’s 
spring forecasts for 2001-2002 (published in April 2001) with respect to the budget 
balance and the real GDP growth rate in the Baltic States. Measured against the 
Maastricht criteria, a couple of preliminary observations can be made: First, during 
the past five years, Estonia and Latvia have been more successful in maintaining 
fiscal discipline than Lithuania. The average annual deficit ratios in Estonia and 
Latvia have not exceeded the Maastricht reference value of 3% of GDP, apart from 
1999. In Lithuania, on the other hand, the average deficit ratio has been above the 
target four times out of five, during the period of 1996-2000. Second, Table 4 
indicates that the deficits exceeding the Maastricht reference value registered in 
Estonia and Latvia in 1999 were associated with the negative real GDP growth rate 
in Estonia and almost non-existent growth in Latvia during that same year. 
Compared to the year 1998, the drop in the real GDP growth rate in 1999 was more 
than 2 per cent in both countries. Moreover, the GDP growth rates were positive 
before 1999 and resumed again in 2000. This suggests that the negative and modest 
growth rates registered in 1999 were temporary and exceptional in both countries. 
As economic growth picked up in 2000, also the excessive deficits returned below 
the reference value of 3% of GDP, both in Estonia and Latvia. However, the deficits 
registered in 1999 were not particularly close to the Maastricht reference value. 
Thus, the principles of closeness, temporariness and exceptionality were not 
observed simultaneously. Consequently, had Estonia and Latvia been members in 
the euro-zone, they probably would have not avoided fiscal sanctions.  
 
The third observation is that in Lithuania, positive GDP growth rates were 
registered in 1997 and 2000, when also the government deficit would have qualified 
with the Maastricht target. The situation in 1999 was opposite as the budget deficit 
exceeded the reference value and the GDP growth rate was negative. What is 
surprising is that in 1996 and 1998, Lithuania enjoyed a strong economic growth, 
while at the same time, the government was running high budget deficits. Moreover, 
the deficits were not particularly close to the Maastricht targets. This implies that 
most likely, the deficits would have been considered excessive, and therefore had 
Lithuania been a euro-zone member, sanctions would have been initiated. The 
  14budget results of 1999 would probably have also led to sanctions, as the deficit was 
not close to the Maastricht reference value. This is so even though the deficit was 
associated with the temporary, and exceptionally negative GDP growth rate. Finally, 
Tables 1- 4 indicate that in all Baltic countries, the direction of changes in deficits 
from one year to another has been the opposite of that in real GDP growth rates. In 
other words, when government deficits have dropped, the real GDP growth 
resumed, or when budget deficits increased, the real GDP growth rate dropped. 
 
The data shown in Tables 1-4 raise various questions. What type of budget 
strategies have the Baltic States followed? Have corrections in budget deficits been 
carried through changes on the expenditure-, or revenue side? What kind of future 
challenges there exists for the Baltic fiscal policies? These questions will be 
addressed below. 
 
At present, all three Baltic States have introduced and are operating based on their 
domestic medium-term fiscal frameworks. In addition, each Baltic country has 
signed so-called Joint Assessment of Economic Policy Priorities with the European 
Commission. These Joint Assessments are based on the medium-term strategies and 
were designed to facilitate the rapid transition to a market economy by the candidate 
countries.  
 
With respect to country-specific developments, Estonia has adopted substantial 
parts of the EMU acquis. Concerning fiscal policy, Estonian authorities have 
followed a prudent fiscal policy ever since the country gained its independence in 
1991. The fiscal discipline is closely related to the fixed exchange rate system, the 
currency board arrangement, according to which direct financing of the government 
by the central bank is prohibited by law.
14 Estonian law does not, however, 
explicitly forbid privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions, but 
this has never taken place in practice. The strict interpretation of a currency board 
means that a country’s monetary authorities practice no active monetary policy, in a 
traditional sense. In consequence, fiscal policy plays a vital role in macroeconomic 
                                                            
14 For a review of the currency board arrangement in Estonia, see Funke (1995). 
  15stabilization. Moreover, as the currency board arrangement implies that monetary 
conditions are pro-cyclical, it is important that fiscal policy becomes counter-
cyclical.
 15 Despite the mainly disciplined and successful fiscal policy in Estonia, the 
deteriorated fiscal situation was registered in 1999. The main causes behind the 
deficit were the sharp decline in economic activity due to the Russian economic 
crisis, which broke in August 1998, and large increases in pensions and wages. The 
year 1999 was, however, followed by strict corrective measures, which have 
accelerated structural reforms and reduced the fiscal deficit. For 2000 the 
government planned a though budget with lower level of expenditures and the 
general budget deficit coming down to around 1 % of GDP. Last year’s 
performance suggests good prospects for a further improvement in macroeconomic 
stability, with domestic demand, especially strong investment and private 
consumption becoming more dynamic and external conditions remaining favorable. 
In consequence, the Commission predicts that strong economic growth will result in 
a positive fiscal balance in 2001-2002.
16 The medium-term fiscal policy priorities in 
Estonia include achieving fiscal balance, mainly by cutting expenditure, lowering 
the tax burden and maintaining the general government external debt level low. 
These objectives require continued harmonization of the Estonian tax policy, 
implementation of key structural reforms, such as pension and health care reforms, 
improving personnel management as well as strengthening the control over public 
finances via budget process. Among the main risks, which may lower the revenue 
projections and increase expenditures, are lower than expected receipts from 
economically significant transit trade, especially concerning the lower oil transit 
from Russia
17, and costs of proceeding with pensions and health sector reforms
18. 
Since last year the progress in pension and health care reforms has been steady. 
However, any postponement would not be recommended, as Estonian population is 
declining and employment falling. Other budgetary challenges in Estonia are related 
                                                            
15 See Benneth (1994), Ghosh, et al. (1998), and Williamson (1995) for a review of related issues. 
16 European Commission (2000b and  2001) and http://www.europa.eu.int 
17 Russia’s GDP growth rate is estimated to halve this year, from 7.7% in 2000 to 3.6% in 2001. At 
the same time, Russia’s energy export is likely to decrease, along with the world energy prices, 
particularly with respect to oil. For more about economic developments in Russia, see European 
Commission (2001). 
18 Concerning the pension reform in the Baltic States, see: Schiff, J. Hobdari, N. Schimmelpfenning 
A. and Zytek, R. 2001. Pension Reform in the Baltic States. Issues and Prospects. IMF Occasional 
Paper No. 200. January 2001. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 
  16to a need to improve the control over the expenditure and debt policy of local 
governments.  
 
Like Estonia, Latvia also has adopted substantial parts of EMU acquis. In particular, 
Latvia’s legislation is in line with that of the Union, prohibiting direct public sector 
financing by the central bank and privileged access of the public sector to financial 
institutions. During the years of 1996-2000, the government deficit exceeded only 
once the Maastricht reference value of 3% of GDP. The economic recession in the 
wake of the Russian crisis was followed by worsened fiscal situation in 1999. The 
adverse budgetary developments resulted from slower than expected growth of 
revenue, higher than expected expenditure on pensions and unemployment benefits, 
and wage increases granted at the end of 1998. In an attempt to limit the worsening 
fiscal situation, an additional budget was approved in the autumn 1999 calling for 
additional spending cuts and increases in tax rates. As a result, the deficit ended up 
being smaller than expected, 4.0 % of GDP, yet still above the Maastricht reference 
value of 3% of GDP. In 2000, the Latvian economy recovered due to improved 
external demand and private consumption. At the end of 1999 Latvia committed to 
fiscal consolidation on the basis of an IMF agreement. The agreement included 
tough fiscal measures, such as reduction of the consolidated budget deficit from 
about 4% of GDP in 1999 to 2% in 2000 and 1% in 2001. However, problems that 
occurred last year, mainly related to the failed attempts to reform the structure of 
public expenditure, suggest that Latvia may have difficulties in fulfilling these fiscal 
objectives. In consequence, the general government deficit last year was close to the 
3% of GDP in 2000. Moreover, this and next year (2001-2002), the deficit is 
expected to remain higher than originally planned, but still below 3% of GDP.
19 In 
the near future, the fiscal policy aims at supporting economic growth and improving 
the efficiency of the public sector and tax administration. The ultimate objective for 
Latvia is to return to near fiscal balance in the medium-term. One of the main 
challenges is the conflict between the use of special budgets and the aim of 
improving budgetary planning. A large amount of expenditures have been handled 
within the special budgets, i.e. extra-budgetary funds. Although these special 
                                                            
19 European Commission (2000b) and http://www.europa.eu.int (2001). 
  17budgets are presented together with the basic budget, spending ministries have 
nevertheless enjoyed a high budgetary autonomy and the disbursements of these 
extra funds have been separately monitored and controlled. On the positive note, 
last year’s budget started to provide the central government the ability to monitor 
some of the expenditure of these funds and this year the government intends to 
incorporate many special budgets into the basic budget. Finally, among the near-
term fiscal policy objectives measures are achieving tight spending limits, 
broadening of the tax base, clarifying the tax benefits, and getting higher tax 
revenues due to recovery in growth. However, like in Estonia, also in Latvia the 
ongoing pension reform is likely to put upward pressure on fiscal expenditures.  
 
Following its Baltic neighbors, Lithuania also has finished most of the work 
concerning the compliance with the EMU acquis. Regarding public finance issues, 
the Lithuanian legislation prohibits privileged access of the public sector to financial 
institutions. However, while Lithuania’s central bank has mainly followed the 
practice of not financing the public sector directly, legislation guaranteeing the 
prohibition of direct public sector financing by the central bank must still be 
adopted. Table 1 suggests that during the years of 1996-2000, general government 
deficit in Lithuania has fulfilled the Maastricht criteria only once, in 1997. Although 
Lithuania followed its Baltic neighbor Estonia and adopted the currency board 
arrangement in 1994, its fiscal policy seems to have been less tight than that in 
Estonia.
20 After the good fiscal year of 1997, the deteriorating fiscal performance 
has reflected in particular the effects of the Russian economic crisis. Public wage 
increases, compensations for households for lost savings during hyperinflation as 
well as support for enterprises affected by the Russian crisis were among the 
reasons for higher expenditures. However, since the crisis program introduced in 
November 1999, various expenditures were frozen, services and subsidies reduced, 
payments postponed and public investments cut back. In consequence, the 2000 
budget foresaw the general government deficit below the Maastricht 3% target 
value, i.e. 2.8% of GDP. In addition to the crisis program, economic growth last 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
20 Camard (1996) and Dubauskas (1996) review monetary and exchange rate policy in Lithuania. 
  18year, which was stimulated by stronger external demand, also contributed to the 
improved fiscal position after 1999.  
 
For the next two years, the public sector finance is expected to improve, provided 
that the government will continue strict fiscal policy. Against the assumption that 
the Lithuanian government would follow tight fiscal policy and proceed with 
reforms, the Commission predicts that the deficit would drop close to 2% of GDP in 
2001 and to 1.4% of GDP in 2002.
21  Lithuanian government itself has set fiscal 
policy objectives, such as improvement in revenue collection and expenditure 
management as well as rationalizing the use of expenditures. This year the 
government aims at near balanced budget, which should be reached by reducing 
expenditures for public sector wages, investment, purchases, and by providing lower 
subsidies and transfers to extra-budgetary funds. Moreover, payments arrears will 
be cleared, while some excise taxes will be raised. These budgetary targets are also 
expected to get support from a continued export growth and recovery in domestic 
demand. Overall, with the adoption of new budgetary legislation, the modernization 
of budgetary structures and management of public expenditure has started, including 




The other fiscal criteria for sustainable fiscal position according to the Maastricht 
convergence criteria requires that the gross government debt should not be higher 
than 60% of GDP. With respect to the Baltic States, the data on gross government 
debt ratios is inadequate but based on the information available, the Baltic 
economies show modest debt ratios compared to the current EU members.  
 
In Estonia, the level of indebtedness of the government has traditionally been very 
low. This has also contributed to the continuing confidence in the sustainability of 
the currency board system and thereby fixed exchange rate. Even after the difficult 
year of 1999, the debt of the general government sector ended amounting only to 
about 5% of GDP. With respect to components of the government debt, domestic 
                                                            
21 European Commission (2000b) and http://www.europa.eu.int (2001). 
  19debt has remained very small and the government’s policy towards external 
borrowing has mainly focused on longer term foreign financing from multilateral 
investment agencies to fund investment projects. 
 
Latvia has experienced growing indebtedness over the past years. However, 
compared to the Maastricht target value, the debt level has remained low. At the end 
of 1999, the gross government debt amounted only to 14% of GDP. The growing 
indebtedness has mainly been due to the higher financing requirement resulting 
from fiscal deficits, investment projects, loans granted to budgets of other levels and 
due to the need to maintain financial liquidity. With respect to the contents of the 
debt, the share of domestic debt is expected to rise in the medium-run. Naturally, 
growing indebtedness leads to higher debt servicing costs. However, for the time 
being, Latvian authorities believe that this will not pose problems to future fiscal 
policy. The country is committed to continue fiscal consolidation. In addition, 
although the privatization is coming to an end, revenues from it will continue to 
play a significant role in terms of financing the budget.  
 
In Lithuania, high government deficits have resulted in a rise of the government 
debt and compared to Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania has reported higher debt ratios. 
At the end of 1999, when also the government deficit was very high, the gross 
government debt amounted to 28% of GDP. Of this, majority, about 78%, consisted 
of gross foreign liabilities. Naturally, as the debt level rises, also the close 
monitoring of the contents of the capital flows becomes ever more important. 
However, it should be noted that despite the rising debt ratio in Lithuania, the level 
is still far below the Maastricht ceiling of 60% of GDP.  
 
Finally, regarding the recent developments in fiscal policy planning, this year 
(2001), the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) 
has launched its pre-accession fiscal surveillance mechanism for candidate 
countries. It consists of two elements: an annual debt and deficit notification, and 
the preparation by the applicant countries of a Pre-accession Economic Program 
(PEP). The first such notification was submitted by the candidate countries at the 
  20beginning of April. The Pre-accession Economic Programs in turn will be submitted 
during the 2001, and they will also be updated annually.
22 DG ECFIN will provide 
an opinion on each PEP in a same way as it does for the Convergence and Stability 
Programs the current member states were obliged to prepare in 1998 and which 
have been updated every year since then. The PEPs aim at providing a possibility 
for a candidate country to outline the economic policies and develop the analytical 
and technical requirements for participation of EMU and eventually the adoption of 
the euro. Most importantly, the PEPs are especially focused on public finance 
issues. 
 
IV. Suitability and Effectiveness of the Maastricht Criteria and the Stability 
and Growth Pact 
In this section, we discuss the benefits and weaknesses of such fiscal rules from the 
Baltic States viewpoint.  To begin with, it could be argued that numerical targets for 
fiscal policy, like the Maastricht ones, are suitable fiscal institutions for the Baltic 
States, because they are very operational and easy to monitor. This applies 
irrespective of whether the Baltic States are considered as EU members or they are 
still in the accession stage. From integration point of view, the Maastricht criteria 
could also be viewed effective institutions, because it clearly shows the stage of 
integration and convergence, i.e. the gap that still has to be closed before a sound 
public finance equilibrium and thereby the ability to join the euro-zone is reached. 
The procedural targets incorporated into the Maastricht criteria can also be 
considered useful, since they assist candidate countries in harmonizing their 
accounting frameworks for computing public finance variables and in adapting 
national procedures to the requirements of budgetary discipline. All that promotes 
the overall integration process.  
 
Numerical fiscal targets, however, can lead to fiscal adjustment that may be 
achieved through non-sustainable policies.
23 A narrow focus on a certain reference 
                                                            
22 Estonia and Latvia had to submit their programs by May 1, 2001 and Lithuania will hand in its 
program by October 1, 2001. 
23 Concerning examples of opportunistic budgetary and accounting behaviors of governments to 
meet the Maastricht deficit and debt criteria, see The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and The World Bank (1999). 
  21value may encourage a country to introduce one-time cosmetic accounting measures 
to meet a deficit and debt target. At first hand, this would cause a loss of 
information about the government’s real budgetary and financial situation. But more 
importantly, in the Baltic type of transitional countries, it could also reflect a 
postponement of vital structural reforms. Indeed, when evaluating the suitability and 
effectiveness of the Maastricht fiscal criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact as 
fiscal institutions, one must realize that transition countries are still young 
democracies and have lower living standards than the current EU members. The 
Baltic States, like the other candidate countries, are yet neither ready EU members 
nor ready market economies, but they are in the middle of accession preparations. 
As a result, the fiscal convergence is being affected by the ongoing transition and 
accession preparations. Both processes tend to put upward pressures on public 
expenditures, as various structural reforms should take place.  Such reforms range 
from restructuring the financial and public sectors and significant industries, 
investment in public transport and environmental infrastructure, to the creation of 
public institutions for the implementation of the Community legislation, acquis.
24 
Both transition and accession also tend to put pressure on political decision-makers, 
not only because of their tendency to increase public costs but also because they 
often tend to show results only in the long run. As a result, it is hardly surprising to 
see that such planned measures are postponed, at least till next elections. Thus, if the 
Maastricht type of fiscal rules encourages a country to take quick-fix measures at 
the expense of structural ones, they naturally are neither suitable nor effective fiscal 
institutions for any country.  
 
With respect to the Baltic States, the structural reforms have been proceeding and 
that there is not clear evidence on “cosmetic accounting measures” instead of actual 
budgetary results being the major determinant of the budget numbers. The view is 
confirmed by the Commission’s progress reports on the Baltic States, although they 
also register slower progress at some points in time. However, the past experience 
not only in the Baltic States but also in the EU countries suggests that fiscal 
                                                            
24 In addition to the Commission Regular Reports, see also the discussion in IMF. 2000. Transcript of 
IMF Press Conferences: From Transition to EU Membership - The Challenges in Developing 
Macroeconomic Frameworks. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 
  22consolidation and structural reform can easily become competing policies, rather 
than complementary and mutually reinforcing. In addition, like so many other 
countries, the Baltic States continue facing the temptation to postpone politically 
challenging structural reforms, especially in the wake of elections. 
 
Among the positive arguments for the Maastricht type of fiscal criteria is that 
without any targets for budgetary policy, governments may have less fiscal 
discipline. If, for example, public debt is on an unsustainable course, it may threaten 
price stability, as a high level of government debt may increase inflationary 
expectations. Moreover, fiscal institutions like the Maastricht rules can protect 
governments against deficit bias, which may exist due to inefficient political 
decision-making. The review of the Baltic fiscal performance presented in the 
previous section has indicated that for the many years all Baltic countries have had 
much lower government debt levels compared to, for example, the Maastricht 
reference value of 60% of GDP. In addition, although inflation in the Baltic States 
has been clearly higher than in the EU, no serious loss of control over inflation has 
taken place during the past five years of transition and accession preparations. On 
the contrary, Table 5 shows that during 1996-2000, annual average inflation has 
systematically been coming down in each Baltic State. Thus, while government 
deficits in the Baltic countries have been sometimes much higher than what the 
Maastricht rules would have allowed, the available data suggests that none of the 
Baltic States has suffered from public debt on an unsustainable course. Against this 
background, the Maastricht rules could serve as tools of fiscal discipline, but 
perhaps more in terms of controlling government deficits, rather than public debt. 
 
One of the arguments against the Maastricht type of fiscal rules is their arbitrariness. 
Why is the deficit restricted to 3% of GDP, instead of, for example, 4% or 5% of 
GDP? Why is public debt limited to 60% of GDP? After all, one can argue that the 
sustainability of fiscal policy may differ across countries. This is an important issue 
especially in the case of transition economies like the Baltic States. As already 
mentioned, transition and accession preparations put upward pressure on fiscal 
expenditure. At the same time, countries with higher real GDP growth rates can 
afford higher deficit/debt per GDP (ceteris paribus). At present, this indeed concerns 
  23the Baltic States, as in the next two years they are expected to grow faster than the 
EU.
25 In consequence, the Baltic States could also run higher deficits and debt 
ratios, provided that the higher rates would be associated with real progress in 
structural reforms. This finding suggests that for the time being the Baltic States 
should not target their budget policies solely on fulfilling the Maastricht fiscal 
targets. However, as far as policies implemented within the EU are concerned, 
applying different rules for different countries would never be politically possible or 
acceptable. Only transitional arrangements could and sometimes have been used.  
 
Another critical factor is that a process of fiscal adjustment concentrating purely on 
deficit and debt reduction might lead, for example, to a situation in which 
policymakers pursuing a balanced budget or some deficit or debt target may favor 
off budget forms of government support. This type of financing does not necessarily 
require cash in the short term, thereby hiding the true cost of underlying state 
support. In general, it is important to shift from a simple budget cost approach to a 
more comprehensive total cost approach.
26 This implies accounting directly for 
contingent liabilities. The financial sector offers a traditional example of the source 
of implicit contingent liabilities, with governments intervening to protect depositors 
and supporting banks that are argued to be too significant to fail.  The banking crisis 
in the Baltic States in 1995 provides a good example for this. In addition to taking 
into account both the explicit and implicit contingent liabilities as a whole, fiscal 
policymakers should also control different types of contingent liabilities. These 
include monitoring financial deficits of state owned enterprises and sub-national 
finances. A total cost approach also requires that fiscal policymakers take into 
account the prevailing overall macroeconomic conditions in order to maintain 
macroeconomic flexibility and credibility.  
 
Concerning the Stability and Growth Pact in particular, a positive argument is that 
rules apply to fiscal policy outcomes, instead of policy intentions. Among the 
weaknesses is that sanctions do not ease the actual problem. This means that 
sanctions do not directly lower deficits or debts. Sanctions in the form of deposits 
                                                            
25 www:europa.eu.int. (2000), www.ecb.org, and European Commission (2000a).   
  24raise a country’s debt ratio, leaving deficit untouched. The most severe penalties, 
fines, in turn result in an increase both in the government deficit and debt. As a 
result, a country may end up in a much worse economic situation than before the 
sanctions. 
 
Another point related to the Pact is that sanctions are imposed only in terms of 
government deficit. But no sanctions or any other measures follow when a country 
breaks the 60% of GDP debt criterion. However, at present, this finding would not 
really play a very important role in the Baltic States, where public debt ratios still 
remain well below the critical value of 60% of GDP. 
 
From the Baltic States’ (as well as from other current or future member countries’) 
point of view it is probably positive that neither noncompliance with the Maastricht 
convergence criteria on fiscal policy, nor the imposition of the sanctions due to an 
excessive deficit leads to the exclusion of the country from the EU. Clearly, already 
for political reasons, taking away EU membership privilege is not an option. This is 
so even though one may argue that institutions, the Maastricht or any other kind, are 
not effective to structure fiscal policy unless they make countries actually to obey 
the rules.  
 
While exclusion from the EU is “unrealistic”, costs of not following the fiscal rules 
and regulations should nevertheless be high enough in order to ensure that countries 
follow these rules. But how do we measure “high enough costs”? First, fiscal 
consolidation is an ongoing process that requires continuous reactions. Second, 
fiscal consolidation is also a country-specific process. Since, both the current 
member countries in the EU as well as the eastern candidate countries differ from 
one another there is hardly a single definition for “high enough costs”. Instead, it 
will always depend on the particular country in question and the economic and 
political situation in that country at a specific point of time. As a result, there is no 
absolute guarantee about the full compliance and enforcement of fiscal rules and 
                                                                                                                                                                   
26 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The World Bank (1999).  
  25procedures, whether by current or new member states. Instead the commitment will 
continue to depend on the circumstances in a country at the time of evaluation.  
 
One of the interesting points related to the Maastricht fiscal institutions is that the 
Treaty does not include a bailout clause, in case some member states do not show 
enough fiscal discipline. However, what happens if the Baltic governments, after 
becoming members, start borrowing more and more? After all, they may find it 
easier to borrow more as the Euroland capital market is bigger than the Baltic one 
and also because borrowing can be done without any exchange rate risk. Many 
would argue that despite the absence of the bailout clause in the Maastricht Treaty, 
other EU members are likely to assist a country in serious trouble, as negative 
effects could otherwise spread over to the rest of them as well. At the same time, it 
should be remembered that the effects of one country’s unsustainable national fiscal 
policy on other member countries would, at least to some degree, depend on the size 
of the country concerned.
27 In this respect, the Baltic States are of the complete 
different category than, for example heavyweights like Germany, UK, Italy or 
France.  It could be assumed that with no bailout in EMU, heavy borrowers would 
still most likely face higher interest payments, providing incentives for a restrained 
fiscal policy. 
 
Finally, one of the traditional arguments against fiscal institutions like the 
Maastricht rules, including the Stability and Growth Pact, is that they limit a 
country’s ability to use fiscal policy to counteract recessions, which may affect one 
member country more than another. After all, freedom to use national fiscal policy 
is the measure most needed in the monetary union, where the monetary policy is 
concentrated at the ECB and determined more by economic developments in bigger 
member countries than smaller ones. The extent to which fiscal policy should 
provide room to act depends on the country concerned. The Stability and Growth 
Pact may actually be suitable and effective institution after all, if it provides enough 
room for stabilization purposes. One way to get an indication of this is to evaluate 
                                                            
27 See von Hagen (1992) 
  26the past cyclical sensitivity of a country’s budget to economic activity.  The next 
section examines this issue. 
 
V. Output Gap Measures and the Cyclical Sensitivity of the Baltic National 
Budgets: Empirical Evidence 
 
In this section, we study the link between budget balance and the output gap in the 
Baltic States to investigate the behavior of the budget over different phases of the 
output cycles. We first need to decide on a procedure to construct a measure of such 
cycles. There are several empirical methods to measure the output cycles.
28 
According to Morrow and Roeger (2001, p.6), “all the available methods have 
‘pros’ and ‘cons’ and none can unequivocally be declared better than the 
alternatives in all cases. Thus, what matters is to have a method adapted to the 
problem under analysis, with well defined limits and, in international comparisons, 
one that deals identically with all countries."  Following the European Commission 
Services, the Hodrick-Presscott (H-P) trend estimation method is employed in this 
paper. 
 
The H-P method is effectively equivalent to applying a moving average filter to a 
measure of output.  This produces a smooth trend with symmetric output gaps, 
which sum to zero over the cycle.  The estimated trend GDP or output merely 
measures the average GDP level.
29 The H-P filter is obtained through a 
minimization method.  Regular fluctuations in output around trend are minimized 
subject to a constraint on the variation of the trend output growth rate. The Lagrange 
multiplier (λ) in the minimization problem is called the smoothing parameter.   
When λ is set to zero, the trend and actual output are equal.  Thus, a larger (smaller) 
λ implies longer (shorter) cycles and bigger (smaller) output gaps.  Because setting 
a value for the smoothing parameter λ is arbitrary, but it is quite important, we 
                                                            
28 There are two commonly used procedures: Statistical trend estimation methods and production 
function approach. The former includes the Hodrick-Prescott filter, band pass filter, linear time trend, 
Kalman filter, and other univariate and multivariate time series methods. A detailed examination and 
comparison of these methods can be found in Morrow and Roeger (2001).  All these procedures 
decompose output into trend and cycle components. Because they are not directly observable, it is 
hard to assess the quality of any resultant estimates of the trend and cycle components.  
29 The terms “output gap” and “GDP gap” are used interchangeably in this and following sections. 
  27follow the suggestion of Hodrick and Presscott (1980) to set a value for λ.
30  These 
values have become the standard practice in the literature. 
 
A potential drawback of the H-P method is the “end-point bias” problem.  This 
arises with symmetric filters, because the data has a finite sample and thus the 
theoretically infinite moving average filter must be truncated at a finite lag.  In this 
case, the filter weights can become asymmetric close to the end points.  Baxter and 
King (1985) show that this problem occurs especially for the last 3 to 4 observations 
and causes the length of the cycles to be underestimated close to these observations.  
To correct for this problem, they suggest extending the data set by adding output 
forecasts over a range of 3 to 4 years.  Morrow and Roeger (2001) investigate the 
qualitative significance of this bias by comparing the Commission’s estimate of the 
GDP gap for all EU member countries with a GDP gap constructed using the 
standard H-P procedure without expanding the GDP series with forecasts. Based on 
some sensitivity calculations, they conclude that the size of the bias for all EU 
countries seems small and thus should not affect findings qualitatively. Given their 
finding and the potential forecast bias associated with extending output series are 
not produced in this paper. 
 
To compute measures of the output gap, we use quarterly real GDP data.
31 The data 
is available from 1993: I to 2000: III, except for Lithuania, which starts from 1995:I. 
The original real GDP data is seasonally adjusted using the multiplicative method. 
Figure 1 plots the real GDP data for all three countries. Figure 1 confirms the earlier 
observations based on Table 4. Namely, that there is a significant drop in real output 
following the Russian crisis in August 1998.  
 
Using the H-P - method, output gaps are constructed.  The gap is defined as the 
difference between the actual GDP minus the trend GDP and expressed, following 
earlier studies, as a ratio with respect to the trend GDP. They are given in Figures 2-
                                                            
30 They suggest setting λ = 100 and 1600 for annual and quarterly data, respectively.  The 
Commission also follows their suggestion in its cyclical adjustment method. 
31  Given our short annual sample period, we have decided to use quarterly data in order to better 
capture the cyclical components of the output. Real GDP data are based on 1995 prices and 
  284.  The output gap figures indicate a similar pattern across the Baltic countries. In 
the earlier years of the transition, there is a negative output gap for all the countries. 
As expected, over time the negative output gap shrinks and turns into a positive 
value. However, due to the Russian crisis in late 1998, the output gap becomes 
negative again in 1999. Estonia and Latvia appear to have recovered quickly from 
the crisis, as the negative output gap declines first and then becomes positive again 
during 2000.  Although there are signs of recovery for Lithuania initially, the output 
gap stays still negative during 1999-2000. Note that Latvia has relatively smaller 
output gap than Estonia and Lithuania. The GDP gap ranges around plus/minus 4 
percent of the trend GDP for Latvia, and plus/minus 6 percent of the trend GDP for 
Estonia and Lithuania.  
 
We next examine the link between actual budget balance and the output gap to 
provide empirical evidence about whether the Baltic States have followed fiscal 
discipline. The budget balance is simply the difference between the revenues and 
expenditures. The quarterly data on revenues and expenditures are available except 
for Lithuania. For the latter, we work with annual data.
32 The following definitions 
are used for the output gaps: a strongly negative output gap is more than –2% of 
trend GDP, a moderately negative output gap ranges from 0% to –2% of trend GDP, 
a moderately positive output gap is between 0% and 2% of trend GDP, and a 
strongly positive output gap is more than 2% of trend GDP. We are now ready to 
examine whether and to what extent the Baltic States have followed the neoclassical 
theory of tax smoothing during different phases of business cycles.  Figures 5-7 plot 
the output gap and budget balance together to evaluate this issue. 
 
Figure 5 provides evidence for Estonia. From 1996 to the first quarter of 1997, the 
output gap ranges from a moderately negative 1% of trend GDP to a strongly 
                                                                                                                                                                   
expressed in domestic currency. The data is obtained from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics, (line number: 99B.P), March 2001 CD ROM version. 
32 The quarterly revenue and expenditures data are available from 1995:I to 2000:III for Latvia and 
from 1996:I to 2000:III for Estonia. The annual data for Lithuania runs from 1995 to 2000. The data 
are taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, (line numbers: 81 and 82, respectively), 
March 2001 CD ROM version, except Estonia, which is generously provided by the Estonian Central 
Bank. 
 
  29negative of 3.5 % of trend GDP. At the same time, the budget deficit registered in 
the first quarter of 1996 switches to a surplus in the second quarter. The surplus 
declines in the course of the year and the budget balance becomes negative again in 
the first quarter of 1997. During the periods of economic slowdown, we observe 
periods of both deficit and surplus, suggesting that there is no clear evidence on tax 
smoothing behavior. When the output gap is positive starting from 1997:II through 
1998:IV and ranging from a moderate to strong, from about 0.5 to 5.5 percent, the 
budget balance again shows some cyclical behavior. It is positive for four quarters, 
but shows deficit when the positive output gap has dropped. During the period from 
1999:II and 2000:I, the negative output gap is associated with budget deficits. Later, 
during 2000:II and III, when the moderately negative output gap becomes 
moderately positive, also the budget turns into surplus. Overall, Figure 5 suggests 
that Estonia has showed fiscal discipline and also to some degree followed the tax 
smoothing principle.  
 
Turning to results for Latvia in Figure 6, we observe strong to moderate positive 
output gaps during the first three quarters of 1996, ranging from 1.7 to 4.4% of the 
trend GDP.  The positive output gaps are combined with budget deficits. Then from 
the fourth quarter of 1996 till the end of 1997 the output gap is moderately negative, 
while the budget is in surplus. During 1998, the output gap ranges from moderately 
positive 1.7% to strongly negative of 2.1% of the trend GDP, while the budget 
shows surplus in the first three quarters, turning then into a deficit towards the end 
of the year. During 1999, there is a moderate to strong negative output gaps together 
with budget deficits. Moreover, in 2000, the output gap improves to a moderately 
positive level, while the budget balance improves, although still remaining negative. 
All in all, the results for Latvia reflect some degree of tax smoothing behavior and 
fiscal discipline throughout the sample period.  
 
For Lithuania, we are restricted to annual data. Figure 7 shows that the first two 
years of 1995 and 1996 are associated with moderately negative output gaps of 
about 1.5 percent of the trend GDP and a budget deficit. However, during the next 
two years, while the output gap ranges from a moderate to strongly positive level, 
  30the budget deficit nevertheless continues to increase. During 1999 and 2000, there 
are again budget deficits along with strong to moderately negative output gaps. 
These results also indicate that Lithuania has shown some signs of tax smoothing 
strategy during the sample period. 
 
Finally, there remains the question of what the budget balance would be if economic 
activity were at its trend level. In particular, we are interested in providing empirical 
evidence for the following question: what was the average budget deficit to GDP in 
a Baltic State when it was operating at its trend level, i.e. when the output gap was 
0% of the trend GDP?  Was it below the Maastricht ceiling of 3% of GDP? Figures 
8-10 indicate that when the output gap has been 0% of the trend GDP, the budget 
deficits have remained within the Maastricht target in Estonia and Latvia, but been 
much higher in Lithuania. This finding suggests that if the Baltic countries commit 
to the medium term objective of keeping their budgets in balance, the Stability and 
Growth Pact would offer a significant room for automatic fiscal stabilizers to 
function in Estonia and Latvia, but not necessarily in Lithuania. Thus, given past 
fiscal and growth performance in the Baltic States, the Stability and Growth Pact 
would seem to be a less useful and suitable fiscal institution to Lithuania than to 
Estonia or Latvia.  
 
VI. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
 
Budgetary institutions are important determinants of fiscal performance. Perhaps 
among the strongest empirical examples of fiscal institutions are the Maastricht 
fiscal rules based on the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
These rules provide countries in the EU, and in particular those, which have adopted 
the euro, with a common code of fiscal conduct. This code of conduct consists of 
reference values for deficit and debt, a common accounting framework for 
computing public finance variables and a call to adapt national procedures to the 
requirements of budgetary discipline. The empirical evidence shows that in the 
course of the 1990s, the Maastricht rules have initiated a process of fiscal 
consolidation and contributed to the fiscal discipline in the EU member states. 
Against this background, this paper has examined to what extent such fiscal 
  31institutions could be useful to the Baltic States, given the past fiscal performance in 
these countries and their current aspirations to become EU members. The 
considerable problems still exist when analyzing the Baltic fiscal data. This has 
been acknowledged in the study and therefore all conclusions presented here should 
be taken as indicative and interpreted with caution.     
 
With respect to fiscal history in the Baltic States, the study has examined years 
during the period from 1996 to 2000. During the period in question, Estonia and 
Latvia have been more successful in maintaining fiscal discipline than Lithuania. 
The average annual budget deficits in Estonia and Latvia have not exceeded the 
Maastricht reference value of 3% of GDP, apart from 1999. In Lithuania, on the 
other hand, the average deficit ratio has been above the target four times out of five 
in the respective period. Concerning gross government debt to GDP, all Baltic 
countries have reported much lower debt levels than the Maastricht reference value 
of 60% of GDP. The past fiscal performance also indicates that all three Baltic 
States have followed, to some degree, the traditional tax smoothing strategy, i.e. 
accumulated deficits during recessions and reported surpluses during the periods of 
economic growth. However, to a larger extent in Lithuania, and to some extent in 
Estonia and Latvia, there is evidence on periods during which the Baltic 
governments ran budget deficits, although the economy was growing.  
 
With respect to suitability and effectiveness of the Maastricht type of fiscal 
institutions, there are both arguments for and against. Numerical targets for fiscal 
policy, like the Maastricht ones, can be suitable fiscal institutions for the Baltic 
States, because they are very operational and easy to monitor. Moreover, from 
integration point of view, the Maastricht criteria could also be considered effective 
institutions, because they show clearly the stage of integration and convergence. 
Another positive argument for the Maastricht type of fiscal institutions is that 
without any targets for budgetary policy, governments may behave with less fiscal 
discipline. Such rules can protect governments against deficit bias, which may exist 
due to inefficient political decision-making. 
 
  32On the negative note, numerical fiscal targets can encourage a country to take 
quick-fix measures at the expense of structural ones. Moreover, like so many other 
countries, the Baltic States continue facing the temptation to delay politically 
challenging structural reforms, especially in the wake of elections. The Maastricht 
rules have also been criticized for being arbitrary and it is therefore argued that the 
reference values may not be useful for countries that grow much faster than the EU 
on average. In consequence, since the Baltic States are expected to grow faster than 
the EU in the future, they could also run higher deficits and debt ratios, provided 
that these higher rates are associated with real progress in structural reforms. One 
characteristic related to the Maastricht rules is that they do not include a provision 
according to which a country would loose its EU membership due to 
noncompliance. There is therefore no absolute guarantee about the full compliance 
and enforcement of fiscal rules and procedures, whether by current or new member 
states. Instead the commitment will continue to depend on particular circumstances 
in a country at the time of evaluation. 
 
Concerning the Stability and Growth Pact in particular, one positive argument is 
that rules apply to fiscal policy outcomes, instead of policy intentions. However, 
sanctions do not necessarily eliminate the actual problem. One of the traditional 
arguments against fiscal institutions is policymakers lose their ability to use fiscal 
policy to counteract recessions.  However, a fiscal institution, such as the Stability 
and Growth Pact, may not actually be suitable and effective institution if it does not 
provide sufficient room for stabilization purposes. The empirical evidence on the 
cyclical sensitivity of the Baltic budgets has provided mixed results. They have 
suggested that if the Baltic countries commit to the medium term objective of 
keeping their budgets in balance, the Stability and Growth Pact would offer enough 
room for automatic fiscal stabilizers to function in Estonia and Latvia, but not 
necessarily in Lithuania. 
 
Finally, with respect to future perspectives, all Baltic economies are currently 
making structural reforms in the fiscal arena, including the adoption of new 
budgetary legislation, the modernization of budgetary structures, and improving the 
  33management of public expenditure. As the Baltic countries proceed with fiscal 
reforms and convergence, it is suggested that fiscal analysis and management in 
these countries focus not only on traditional government budget and debt but also 
includes contingent and implicit liabilities as well. 
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  39Table 1: Government Balance in the Baltic States, % of GDP
1 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000    2001 2002 
         
Estonia
2  -1.9 2.2 -0.3 -4.7 -0.7 0.1 0.0 
Latvia
3  -1.7 0.1 -0.8 -4.0 -2.8 -1.9 -1.1 
Lithuania








1 With respect to national definitions for government balance, see: European Commission. (2000a 
and 2000c), and http://www.europa.eu.int (2001). 
2 Government sector consists of Central government basic budget, social security fund, medical 
insurance fund, the extra-budgetary Forestry and Environmental fund, and local government. In 
Estonia there are also a number of extra-budgetary funds. 
3  Government sector consists of Central government basic budget, Central government Special 
Budget (which includes the Special Social Security Budget), local government, and the local 
government Special Budget. A large number of special budgets represent about 50% of central 
government expenditure
 
4 Government sector consists of Central government budgetary units, most extra-budgetary funds 
(including the privatization fund and the Agricultural Reform Fund), the State Social Insurance Fund, 
and the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund. There are separate state insurance funds for health and 
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Table 2: Government Revenues in the Baltic States, % of GDP 
  1997 1998 1999  2000  Budget 
      
Estonia  40.4 38.4 36.0 39.5 
Latvia  41.0 40.8 36.5 39.1 
Lithuania  32.6 34.0 32.9 34.1 






Table 3: Government Expenditures in the Baltic States, % of GDP 
  1997 1998 1999  2000  Budget 
      
Estonia  38.2 38.7 40.7 40.6 
Latvia  40.8 41.7 40.1 41.0 
Lithuania  33.7 39.4 40.7 36.9 








Table 4: Real GDP Growth Rate in the Baltic States, % 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
         
Estonia  3.9 10.6 4.7 -1.1 6.6   5.9 5.7 
Latvia  3.3 8.6 3.9 0.1 5.7    5.5 5.5 
Lithuania  4.7 7.3 5.1 -4.1 2.9    3.5 4.0 








Table 5: Inflation in the Baltic States, %, annual average 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
         
Estonia  19.8  9.5 9.3 3.3 4.1 4.7 3.5 
Latvia  17.6  8.4 4.7 2.3 2.6    1.8 3.2 
Lithuania  24.6  8.9 5.1 0.8 1.0 1.5 2.5 
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